
Up from Under: A Note on Structural
Mimesis by Carter Ratcliff
The screenplay of Sunset Boulevard begins with instructions for the camera,
which is to focus on
the actual street sign: SUNSET BOULEVARD, stenciled on a curbstone. In
the gutter lie dead leaves, scraps of paper, burnt matches and cigarette
butts. It is early morning.
Now the CAMERA leaves the sign and MOVES EAST, the grey asphalt of the
street filling the screen . . .
Dragging us into the gutter, the camera presents us with symbols of
dereliction, disintegration, and death. Then, as the opening credits roll,
it sends us sailing along the pavement of the boulevard, with its “white
arrows, speed limit warnings, manhole covers, etc.” Dull reminders of the
metropolitan traffic flow. Sirens drift into the sound track and we see
police cars careening toward the camera, swerving into a driveway. By now, a
voice-over has let us know that something serious is afoot. “A murder has
been reported in one of those great big houses in the ten thousand block . .
.”
So far, the camera has played the part of a well-positioned onlooker with a
flair for prophesy. Before the action began, it gave us a quick look at a
few images flavored with the horrors of the story to come. Next, it settled
into its familiar task of representing people in action, to borrow a phrase
from Aristotle’s Poetics. The people represented by the camera are, of
course, actors—members of a cast going through their paces. To act is to
mimic—or imitate—things people have done or might possibly do, so a movie is
doubly representational: a motion picture of behavior that is itself a kind
of picturing. .
Most of us understand all this with no help from Aristotle or any of the
later writers who took up his arguments. In some way that has never been
fully explicated, everyday rationality includes an intuitive sense of the
difference between fiction and non-fiction. At first glance, it looks as if
the difference must turn on the question of truth, and it does, but not in a
way that that lets us conclude, simply, that non-fiction is true and fiction
is false. If that were so, then fictions—Sunset Boulevard, Bacchus in
Thebes, and so on—would count as lies. But they do not because, as Sir
Philip Sidney observed, the poet “nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth.”
The point is that we have no business bringing the question of truth to bear
on a work of fiction, though of course we can’t always keep ourselves from
saying, for example, that Citizen Kane offers a true insight into the
American ego. What we mean is that the movie rings true to our hunches about
American egos at their most rampantly ambitious. Likewise, the figure of
Hamlet rings true to any number of things: our experience of inward
instability, our speculations about the emergence of the modern individual,
and much more, including, possibly, our squeamishness about shedding
blood—assuming, of course, that we are squeamish about shedding blood. Every
image or character rings true or false in a distinctive way for each member
of the audience. Our responses to Hamlet are personal and do not require
anything like proof to have their full meaning for each of us. Consequently,
Hamlet raises no issue of supra-personal, objective truth. To say that a
play or movie or novel illuminates the truth is to speak metaphorically. In
the straightforward, hard-nosed sense of “truth,” works of fiction are, as
Sydney said, neither true nor false. They are interesting or boring, lively
or flat, significant or forgettable. If they are significant, it is because
they engage us with representations of things that we care about. They are
mimetically powerful.
Before I go on, I ought to say something about “mimesis.” From the time of
the Renaissance until late in the 18th century, translators usually rendered
this Greek word as “imitation.” Later, “representation” was preferred. I
will follow this usage, though it is not adequate to the ancient idea of
mimesis, which included much that we now would not consider
“representational.” Music that Aristotle called mimetic we would call
expressive. Of course, expression can be representational. Complications
like these are fascinating but beside the present point, which does not
require me to us “mimesis.” When I do, it is not in aid of a historical
argument but simply as a reminder that the questions I am raising here, in
the present tense, have their origins in the distant past.
Talk of mimesis usually refers to images, visual or verbal. T. S. Eliot’s
“forgetful snow,” in the first part of The Waste Land, for example, or
William Blake’s Urizen, the rigid and oppressive principle of rationality,
which he pictures as an old man measuring off the universe with a pair of
compasses. These images are not only intelligible. They are persuasive.
Still, it would be an error to let them persuade us that they are true. Nor
is it true that, when dolphins leap from the sea, they tear the water.
Nonetheless, William Butler Yeats’s image of the ancient, “dolphin-torn”
Mediterranean makes a sort of sense if one has gotten into the desperate,
exalted mood of Byzantium, the poem where this image appears. Images,
however, are not the sole means of representation.
Byzantium is a forty-line poem divided into five eight-line stanzas. Ranging
in length from three to five iambs, these lines are display an intricate
pattern of rhymes: AABBCDDC. Here, then, is a structure at once orderly and
complex—fittingly enough, as I see it, for I am in the habit of decorating
my large and vague idea of Byzantium with the subordinate ideas of rigid
hierarchy and labyrinthine deviousness. However, there is more to say about
the structure of Yeats’s poem, for he inflects the complex orderliness of
his stanza with any number of nuances—slant rhymes, repetition in place of
rhyme, dactyls in place of iambs, truncated iambs, and more. Sometimes,
these devices introduce new, narrowly local instances of order, as when a
line ending in “handiwork” is followed by a line ending the same word.
Repeated end-words halt the flow of the poem. Form freezes up, if only for a
moment. Rigidity becomes instability when Yeats leaves certain lines bereft
of a syllable or two. With bits of the iambic line missing, the larger
architecture of the stanza seems to crumble. Both effects—rigidity and
wobbliness—comport well with Yeats’s picture of lifeless, ruined Byzantium.
Yet neither effect appears in that picture. They are represented by the
structure of the poem, not by its images.
Like Yeats, T. S. Eliot was a modernist suspicious of modernity. Before
secularism undermined faith, before democracy challenged monarchy, culture
was been unified, and its unity was beautiful—or so Eliot believed, on very
little evidence. Nonetheless, he lamented the past, and The Wasteland,
abounds with images of modern dissolution, collapse, and centrifugal
distress. However, the most powerful images of crisis are in the stanzaic
structure of the poem, which dispenses with smooth transitions and nearly
every other means of inducing form to cohere. A unified poetic form
represents a world shaped by an ideal of harmony. A disjunctive form
represents a world indifferent to the ideal or, possibly, the ruin of the
ideal itself. In any case, structure is mimetic. It has a representational
meaning, however elusive.
Just over a decade before Eliot published The Waste Land, Georges Braque and
Pablo Picasso pasted carefully cut-out pieces of paper to the surfaces of
their paintings. The year was 1912, and by then they had invented Cubism, a
style that reduces images of people and things to schematic patterns. It
then disassembles the patterns, not entirely but enough to suggest a world
of jarring, jostling discontinuities. Limiting themselves to oil paint,
Braque and Picasso had become maestros of disjunction. With collage, as
their method of pasted paper came to be called, they made disjunction their
salient theme. Never before had the unity of the painted surface been so
deliberately, so abruptly disrupted. Like Eliot in the 1920s, but not in his
elegiac mood, the Cubists were representing a certain quality of modern
life.
Visual Arts
© 2005-2008 Per Contra: The International Journal of the Arts, Literature and Ideas
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